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Summary: The paper explores causal linkages between interbank and sove-
reign bond markets in 14 OECD countries, the Euro area and Russia during the
2008-2009 crisis and post-crisis period. The analysis has been carried out for
individual countries and in a multivariate framework. It enables to identify sys-
temically important countries in both markets. The USA, Switzerland, Australia,
South Korea and Russia are of particular significance in the interbank lending 
market. Switzerland, the UK, Poland, Australia and Canada play a pivotal role
in the public debt market. The analysis under the multivariate framework re-
veals substantial heterogeneity in the network structure of both markets. Only 
12% of causal relationships coincide, which may fuel financial contagion. Vola-
tility spillovers underlie the causal linkages. They are estimated by means of
dynamic volatility indices based on rolling correlation matrices and help identify 
the transformation of the international banking turmoil into the sovereign debt
crisis.
Key words: Interbank lending markets, Public debt, Granger causality, Diks-
Panchenko test, Rolling correlations. 
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Sovereign indebtedness in developed economies remains an overriding challenge for 
theorists and policymakers. It may take years, if not more, to resolve the problem. 
Thus, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2011a) who argued that the period fol-
lowing the Great Recession could be called “a decade of debt” may be right. 
It is important to bear in mind that the current situation has largely arisen from 
the attempts to ameliorate the effect of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. National gov-
ernments had to bail out financial institutions, which in some cases seriously under-
mined their fiscal balances. In this paper I focus on the interaction between interbank 
lending and sovereign bond markets in 14 OECD countries, the Euro area and Russia 
during the 2008-2009 crisis and post-crisis period. Disruptions in interbank lending 
are reliable predictors of systemic banking crises primarily due to its network nature 
(Andreas Krause and Simone Giansante 2012). However, to the best of my know-
ledge, the crisis transmission from an interbank to a public debt market remains in-
sufficiently explored. First I analyze it for individual countries and then, in a multiva-
riate framework. A significant heterogeneity in the network structure of the two mar- 
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kets is found. Moreover, they are characterized by separated incomplete networks 
which seem to spur crisis propagation. I proceed by constructing dynamic volatility 
indices for both markets based on rolling correlations. The two indices help identify 
the transformation of the banking crisis into the public debt crisis, i.e. the moment of 
the credit transfer, which, according to the estimations, occurred in October-
November 2009. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly surveys relevant literature. 
In Section 2 the data, methodology and results of causality analysis between inter-
bank and public debt markets for individual countries in the sample are presented. 
Section 3 examines the interrelations for both markets within the sample, pointing to 
possible contagion effects. Section 4 assesses volatility dynamics underlying these 
effects in each of the markets. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. Literature Review 
 
Financial crises, in particular, banking ones, help predict sovereign debt crises. Ac-
cording to Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b), government debts rise about 86 percent in 
the three years following a systemic financial crisis. Davide Furceri and Aleksandra 
Zdzienicka (2012), and Athanasios Tagkalakis (2013) similarly report significant 
post-crisis upswings in public debt to GDP ratios in advanced economies. Irina Bal-
teanu and Aitor Erce (2012) analyze twin bank-public debt crises in 117 developing 
and emerging economies in an event-study framework and find that they are pre-
ceded by high banking sector leverage and involve boom-bust growth patterns and a 
build-up of government debt. 
From the public finance perspective, banking crises may turn very costly as 
Patrick Honohan (2008), and Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia (2012) assert. It is due 
to contingent liabilities assumed by public authorities and materialized during finan-
cial crises. These liabilities may both be explicit (e.g. loan and export guarantees, 
government insurance programs, etc.) and implicit. Though the relative importance 
of various types of contingent liabilities is country-specific, implicit liabilities have 
generally been the most burdensome, with bailouts being their main ingredient 
(Aliona Cebotari 2008).  
However, contingent liabilities don’t warrant any panacea for a country en-
gulfed by financial instability. During severe banking crises contingent liabilities, 
such as blanket guarantees on bank liabilities may be insufficient and should be 
complemented with massive liquidity injections. Using a sample of 42 banking cris-
es, Laeven and Valencia (2008) figure out that blanket guarantees are successful in 
mitigating liquidity pressures arising from deposit withdrawals, whereas banks’ for-
eign liabilities appear irresponsive to this type of guarantees. Agnes Benassy-Quere 
and Guillaume Roussellet (2012) assess the effect of contingent liabilities stemming 
from systemically important EU banks on fiscal sustainability in a tax-gap frame-
work. They find that every percentage point rise in the differential between interest 
and growth rate after the banking crisis raises the tax gap by 1% of GDP. Therefore, 
an excessive use of contingent liabilities may exacerbate moral hazard problems in 
the banking sector and eventually precipitate the transformation of a banking turmoil 
into a public debt crisis.  
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In addition to direct fiscal disruptions, banking crises affect the post-crisis real 
growth dynamics, making the fiscal sustainability rebound more complicated.   
Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Enrica Detragiache, and Raghuram Rajan (2008) present the 
evidence that they are especially detrimental to the industrial sectors heavily reliant 
on external finance and/or populated by small firms. Consequently, the transmission 
channel from banking to public debt crises should be carefully studied. 
To quantify this spillover, Serkan Arslanalp and Yin Liao (2012) explore the 
link between contingent liabilities and sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads 
for 32 countries and find that one percent GDP increase in these liabilities results in 
24 basis points (bps) rise of CDS spreads of developed economies and in 75 bps for 
emerging markets. Other papers consider sovereign credit default spreads together 
with a selection of bank CDS series from the countries in question (Jacob Ejsing and 
Wolfgang Lemke 2011; Viral V. Acharya, Itamar Drechsler, and Philipp Schnabl 
2012; Adrian Alter and Yves S. Schuler 2012). Their major finding is consonant: a 
credit risk transfer between banking sectors and sovereign bonds has been unders-
cored, with causality running from banks to sovereigns till bail-outs are announced, 
and vice versa afterwards. 
 
2. Causality Issues between Interbank and Public Debt Markets 
 
The relationship between interbank and public debt markets is studied for 14 OECD 
countries, the Euro area and Russia from September 2008 till August 2012. Three 
monthly data series for each country are used: 3-month interbank interest rates or 
their equivalents (INTB_RATE), secondary market yields of 10-year sovereign bonds 
(LONGT_RATE) and main central bank rates. Monthly data are business daily aver-
ages. The data on interbank rates and sovereign bond yields come from the OECD 
Statistics (Monthly monetary and financial statistics) while main central bank rates 
are retrieved from respective central bank sites. The sample composition is entirely 
determined by data availability: all the countries with missing values in one of the 
series are excluded. For the Euro area, 3-month Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURI-
BOR) is used as an interbank market indicator and weighted sovereign bond yields as 
a public debt indicator. Descriptive statistics are given below (Table 1). 
Granger tests have been carried out to uncover causality directions between in-
terbank and public debt markets for each country. To properly specify lag length of 
these tests, I rely on an optimal lag number of VARs where interbank rates and sove-
reign bond yields enter as endogenous variables and main central bank rates as ex-
ogenous ones. The inclusion of the central bank rates in the VARs appears relevant 
as they may have a significant impact on interbank rates and sovereign bond yields 
through the channel of monetary transmission. Thus, by explicitly modeling this ef-
fect I minimize the risk of finding a spurious co-movement between the interbank 
and sovereign bond markets caused by a third factor. 
As no cointegration is found in pairwise framework, unrestricted VAR rather 
than VECM should be applied. Prior to making VARs, these time series are subject 
to unit root tests (Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests) and the first differences of the data 
are taken in case of non-stationarity. The overall VAR stability is checked by means 
of inverse roots of AR characteristic polynomial. If they lie inside a unit circle, a  
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 Table 1   Descriptive Statistics for INTB_RATE and LONGT_RATE 
 
Country / variables  Min  Max Mean  Std.  dev.  Jarque-Bera
test statistic 
Jarque-Bera 
test p-value 
Australia 
INTB_RATE 
LONGT_RATE 
Target cash rate 
3.10 
2.89 
3.00 
7.27 
5.80 
7.00 
4.37 
4.82 
4.20 
0.81 
0.79 
0.81 
10.30 
6.10 
9.03 
 
0.005 
0.047 
0.011 
Canada 
INTB_RATE 
LONGT_RATE 
Target rate 
0.38 
1.65 
0.25 
3.29 
3.68 
3.00 
1.10 
2.92 
0.85 
0.66 
0.60 
0.56 
58.57 
5.71 
45.92 
 
0.000 
0.058 
0.000 
Czech Republic 
INTB_RATE 
LONGT_RATE 
Lombard rate 
1.00 
2.38 
1.50 
4.24 
5.45 
4.50 
1.70 
4.00 
2.12 
0.85 
0.70 
0.69 
37.35 
0.27 
76.14 
 
0.000 
0.870 
0.000 
Denmark 
INTB_RATE 
LONGT_RATE 
Discount rate 
-0.12 
1.10 
0.00 
5.26 
4.39 
4.44 
1.39 
2.90 
1.25 
1.31 
0.85 
1.02 
46.27 
2.92 
48.22 
 
0.000 
0.230 
0.000 
Iceland 
INTB_RATE 
LONGT_RATE 
Current rate 
4.00 
4.99 
3.25 
18.57 
15.01 
17.50 
7.88 
7.13 
7.18 
4.50 
1.98 
4.17 
16.45 
87.01 
7.48 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.023 
Japan 
INTB_RATE 
LONGT_RATE 
Policy rate 
0.33 
0.78 
0.05 
0.89 
1.49 
0.50 
0.45 
1.16 
0.09 
0.16 
0.19 
0.08 
17.07 
2.13 
511.47 
 
0.000 
0.340 
0.000 
South Korea 
INTB_RATE 
LONGT_RATE 
Base rate 
2.41 
3.09 
2.00 
6.03 
5.99 
5.25 
3.22 
4.61 
2.70 
0.84 
0.69 
0.72 
52.76 
1.60 
13.83 
 
0.000 
0.450 
0.000 
New Zealand 
INTB_RATE 
LONGT_RATE 
Official cash rate 
2.59 
3.40 
2.50 
7.95 
6.02 
7.50 
3.22 
5.09 
3.02 
1.15 
0.80 
1.21 
215.68 
5.22 
161.01 
 
0.000 
0.073 
0.000 
Norway 
INTB_RATE 
LONGT_RATE 
Key policy rate 
1.87 
1.73 
1.25 
6.92 
4.49 
5.25 
2.87 
3.37 
2.13 
1.11 
0.75 
0.97 
136.99 
4.93 
118.67 
 
0.000 
0.084 
0.000 
Poland 
INTB_RATE 
LONGT_RATE 
Reference rate 
3.81 
4.88 
3.50 
6.85 
6.35 
6.00 
4.59 
5.85 
4.10 
0.72 
0.35 
0.68 
28.43 
3.52 
11.43 
 
0.000 
0.170 
0.003 
Sweden 
INTB_RATE 
LONGT_RATE 
REPO rate 
0.15 
1.33 
0.25 
4.49 
3.90 
4.67 
1.14 
2.74 
1.31 
0.93 
0.71 
1.03 
29.18 
4.39 
25.32 
 
0.000 
0.110 
0.000 
Switzerland 
INTB_RATE 
LONGT_RATE 
Swiss average rate overnight 
0.01 
0.56 
-0.05 
2.96 
2.76 
1.73 
0.34 
1.64 
0.10 
0.57 
0.62 
0.26 
503.40 
2.82 
2147.18 
 
0.000 
0.240 
0.000 
UK 
INTB_RATE 
LONGT_RATE 
Official bank rate 
0.56 
1.64 
0.50 
6.18 
4.58 
5.00 
1.27 
3.28 
0.79 
1.22 
0.77 
0.94 
209.17 
4.07 
360.98 
 
0.000 
0.130 
0.000 
USA 
INTB_RATE 
LONGT_RATE 
Federal funds target rate 
0.19 
1.53 
0.13 
4.32 
3.85 
2.00 
0.59 
2.90 
0.21 
0.82 
0.70 
0.32 
311.60 
4.16 
1037.53 
 
0.000 
0.120 
0.000 
Euro area 
INTB_RATE 
LONGT_RATE 
Euro area REPO rate 
0.33 
3.01 
0.75 
5.11 
4.66 
4.25 
1.35 
3.96 
1.31 
1.04 
0.39 
0.72 
114.10 
1.62 
164.49 
 
0.000 
0.440 
0.000 
Russia 
INTB_RATE 
LONGT_RATE 
Refinancing rate 
4.20 
7.55 
7.75 
27.83 
10.58 
13.00 
8.55 
8.52 
9.19 
5.22 
0.86 
1.79 
56.49 
9.68 
10.10 
 
0.000 
0.010 
0.006 
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
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VAR satisfies the stability condition. The optimal lag length selection is primarily 
based on LR test statistic which is complemented with a set of information criteria - 
final prediction level (FPE), Akaike (AIC), Schwarz (SC) and Hannan-Quinm (HQ). 
The results of pairwise Granger causality / block exogeneity Wald test are summa-
rized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2   Granger Causality between Interbank and Public Debt Markets 
 
Country Lag  length  INTB_RATE does not cause LONGT_RATE  LONGT_RATE does not cause INTB_RATE 
Chi-squared-statistic  p-value  Chi-squared-statistic  p-value 
Australia 1  2.23  0.14  1.26  0.26 
Canada  2 0.32 0.85  4.94 0.08 
Czech Republic  2  4.46  0.11  3.58  0.17 
Denmark  3 1.75 0.63  7.19 0.06 
Iceland  1 2.25 0.13  16.40 0.00 
Japan  1  2.72 0.09  0.77 0.38 
South Korea  1  1.40  0.24  2.07  0.15 
New Zealand  3  18.31 0.00 8.67 0.03 
Norway 2 2.65 0.27  2.83  0.24 
Poland 2 1.30  0.52  1.36  0.51 
Sweden 1  2.26 0.13  0.01  0.92 
Switzerland  1  3.58 0.06  1.71 0.19 
UK 1  2.15  0.14  2.45  0.12 
USA 1  2.94 0.09 8.49 0.00 
Euro area  1  0.34  0.56  0.25  0.62 
Russia  1 0.05 0.83  14.33 0.00 
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
In 8 cases causal linkages between interbank and public debt markets during 
the 2008-2009 crisis and post-crisis period are found. In Japan and Switzerland inter-
bank lending markets Granger cause public debt markets. The relationship is bidirec-
tional in the USA and New Zealand. In Canada, Denmark, Iceland and Russia sove-
reign debt markets unidirectionally influence interbank lending markets. However, it 
is surprising that no linkage is found in case of the major economies (the UK, the 
Euro area).  
A possible explanation is that the linkages may be of nonlinear nature. For ex-
ample, up to a certain level of interbank rates, government bond rates may remain 
irresponsive but after the threshold has been reached, they may overshoot. Standard 
Granger causality (or, to be precise, non-causality) tests do not account for this non-
linearity. 
Consequently, the next step in the analysis is to find out if there is nonlinearity 
in the examined bi-variate relationships. To this end, BDS test is carried out for the 
VAR residuals (William A. Brock et al. 1996). Its null hypothesis states that the resi-
duals are independent and identically distributed (ibid). If it is rejected, nonlinear 
linkages between interbank and public debt markets may indeed be present for a giv- 
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en country. As the complete output of the BDS test is bulky, I only enlist countries 
with possible nonlinear causal relationships, but the results of the test are available 
from the author upon request. BDS test points to the possible nonlinearity for a vast 
majority of the sample: Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Iceland, Japan, Norway, 
Poland, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the US, the Euro area and Rus-
sia. The null hypothesis holds for Denmark and New Zealand, meaning that linear 
Granger causality tests are sufficient to adequately capture the causal relationship 
between interbank and public debt markets in these countries. For the first sub-
sample linkages should additionally be tested by means of a nonlinear causality test. 
Over the past 20 years several nonlinear causality tests have been proposed, 
e.g. Ehung G. Baek and Brock (1992), and Craig Hiemstra and Jonathan D. Jones 
(1994). I resort to the nonparametric test by Cees G. H. Diks and Valentin Panchenko 
(2006). This test tends to outperform Hiemstra-Jones test as the latter looks spurious 
due to the rejection probabilities under the null hypothesis converging to one with the 
rising sample size. Diks and Panchenko replaced the global test statistic with an av-
erage of local conditional dependence measures and formulated practical guidelines 
for choosing an optimal bandwidth depending on the sample size. The test has been 
applied to estimate causal relationships between exchange rates (Stelios D. Bekiros 
and Diks 2008a), stock prices and trading volumes (Shyh-Wei Chen 2008), spot and 
future commodity prices (Bekiros and Diks 2008b), finance-growth nexus (Henryk 
Gurgul and Lukasz Lach 2012), fiscal policy and economic growth (Stella   
Karagianni, Maria Pempetzoglou, and Anastasios Saraidaris 2012). 
In this paper the test has been applied to VAR residuals and run in both direc-
tions for the lag number from 1 to 5 and for the bandwidth equal to 1.5, taking into 
account the time series length. Its null hypothesis resembles that of Granger causality 
test, namely, X does not help predict Y and Y does not help predict X. T-statistic is 
calculated to check the null (Table 6, Appendix). 
The test underscores the nonlinear bidirectional causality for Russia signifi-
cant at 5% level and weak evidence of causality running from the public debt market 
to the interbank lending one for Japan, Poland, Switzerland, the Euro area and the 
UK. In a nutshell, after controlling for nonlinear causality, there are 11 countries with 
linkages between the two markets. For Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Poland, the Euro 
area and the UK the causal relationship is running from the public debt market to the 
interbank one. In case of Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, the USA and Russia the 
causality is bidirectional. There is no evidence in favor of any causal relationship for 
Australia, Czech Republic, South Korea, Norway and Sweden. 
 
3. Multiple Causal Relationships in Interbank and Public Debt 
Markets 
 
I estimated the relationship between interbank and public debt markets in a bi-variate 
VAR framework for each of the countries in the sample. For a number of important 
economies no statistically significant causal linkage has been underscored. Notwith- 
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standing this empirical result, it doesn’t necessarily mean that such relationship is 
indeed non-existent. It may be of high-order moments that are difficult to capture 
even by means of nonparametric causality tests.  
Additional information could have been obtained by means of other econome-
tric techniques such as multivariate GARCH models. They are not aimed at address-
ing causality issues but help figure out if there is any volatility spillover between 
markets which can be treated as a necessary, but insufficient prerequisite for causal 
linkages. However, in our case it is problematic to construct stable GARCH models 
even in a bi-variate framework due to a relatively small length of the time series. 
Recently introduced measures, such as CoVaR (Tobias Adrian and Markus K. 
Brunnermeier 2011), equi-correlations (Robert F. Engle and Bryan T. Kelly 2012) or 
metrics built from pieces of variance decompositions (Francis X. Diebold and Kamil 
Yilmaz 2011) that shed light on financial connectedness can hardly be applied either 
as they do not deal with causality issues. 
Linkages may be transmitted from interbank to public debt markets in a roun-
dabout way. For example, country A is characterized by bidirectional causality be-
tween the markets and at the same time is closely connected with country B in each 
of them, say, being Granger-caused by B in the interbank market and Granger-
causing B in the public debt one. Then, an impulse generated by country B’s inter-
bank market will ultimately affect this country’s public debt rates through several 
transmission stages. Consequently, it may arrive both amplified and weakened. This 
hypothetical example justifies the necessity to study multiple causal relationships 
between the countries in both markets. 
To this end, multivariate VAR methodology has been applied. Two VARs for 
interbank and public debt markets are estimated. All the 16 country variables are 
treated as endogenous. Again it is necessary to control for changes in main central 
bank rates. Instead of fitting the entire set of these rates in the equation that would 
result in VAR identification problems, I first apply principal components analysis 
(PCA) and use three most important components as exogenous variables. They cu-
mulatively explain 79% of the variation in the main central bank rates. They are se-
lected on the basis of Kaiser criterion (their eigenvalues should exceed 1) and the 
corresponding scree plot, which is a standard approach for the PCA (Table 7 and 
Figure 2 in Appendix). 
Then I specify an appropriate lag length on the basis of LR test statistic com-
plemented with a set of information criteria. The optimal lag length is equal to 1 and 
the models satisfy the stability condition, judging by inverse roots of AR characteris-
tic polynomial lying within a unit circle. Then Granger causality / block exogeneity 
Wald tests are carried out. All the linkages that are significant at least at 10-percent 
level are denoted with 1 and inserted into causality matrices. The linkages are 
marked in columns, with Granger causing variables being in the upper horizontal 
line. The results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
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Table 3   Multiple Causal Relationships between Interbank Markets 
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A u s t r a l i a                    0 
Canada      1     1            2 
Czech  Republic       1            1  2 
Denmark  1       1             2 
Iceland     1     1         1     1  4 
Japan          1      1  1  1    1  5 
K o r e a              1         1 
N e w   Z e a l a n d        1               1 
N o r w a y                 1      1 
Poland     1      1        1     1  4 
Sweden              1  1  1     3 
S w i t z e r l a n d        1               1 
UK  1       1  1      1  1      1  6 
U S A          1             1 
E u r o   a r e a                      0 
Russia   1  1      1  1            4 
GIVE  2 1 2 2 2 4 4 2 0 1 2 3 4 3 0 5   
NSI  1.00 -0.33 0.00  0  -0.33 -0.11 0.60 0.33 -1.00 -0.60  0  0.50 -0.20 0.50  N/A  0.11   
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
Table 4   Multiple Causal Relationships between Public Debt Markets 
 
  
A
u
s
t
r
a
l
i
a
 
C
a
n
a
d
a
 
C
z
e
c
h
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
 
I
c
e
l
a
n
d
 
J
a
p
a
n
 
K
o
r
e
a
 
N
e
w
 
Z
e
a
l
a
n
d
 
N
o
r
w
a
y
 
P
o
l
a
n
d
 
S
w
e
d
e
n
 
S
w
i
t
z
e
r
l
a
n
d
 
U
K
 
U
S
A
 
E
u
r
o
 
a
r
e
a
 
R
u
s
s
i
a
 
R
E
C
E
I
V
E
 
Australia    1  1         1     1      4 
Canada             1    1    1  1  4 
Czech  Republic  1     1              1  3 
Denmark  1  1                 2 
Iceland         1      1  1       3 
Japan    1    1        1         3 
K o r e a                1      1   2 
New  Zealand  1  1    1      1  1          5 
Norway  1  1  1         1     1      5 
Poland  1  1     1             1  4 
Sweden    1          1         2 
S w i t z e r l a n d                    0 
U K   1            1          2 
USA  1  1      1        1  1      5 
Euro  area         1       1         2 
Russia         1  1    1            3 
GIVE  7 7 3 2 3 2 3 0 0 9 2 2 5 0 1 3   
NSI  0.27 0.27  0  0  0.00  -0.2  0.20  -1  -1.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.43 -1.00 -0.33 0.00   
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
The tables also include the sum of cases when this or that country Granger 
causes others (the last but one horizontal line denoted as “GIVE”) and the sum of 
cases when it is Granger caused (the last right hand column “RECEIVE”). A compo-
site indicator called “Net Spillover Index (NSI)” is computed for each country (Euro-
pean Banking Federation - EBF 2011):  
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RECEIVE GIVE
RECEIVE GIVE
NSI


 .  (1)
 
The indicator accounts for the net impact of a country in the interbank or pub-
lic debt market networks. By definition, NSI takes on values from -1 to 1. The closer 
it is to 1, the more countries are Granger caused by the country in question, or simi-
larly, the latter is less vulnerable to an external influence. 
Judging by NSIs, the USA, Switzerland, Australia and South Korea primarily 
Granger cause others in the interbank lending markets. Switzerland, the UK and Pol-
and constitute a pool of most influential countries in the sovereign debt market. It is 
also instructive to consider the total number of causal linkages for a country (both 
outgoing and incoming, i.e. GIVE+RECEIVE). This indicator describes how central 
the role of a particular country in the network is (Sanjeev Goyal 2009). In the inter-
bank lending market the UK, Japan and Russia top the list, whilst in the public debt 
market Poland, Australia and Canada lead. This analysis is instrumental in revealing 
systemically important countries in international finance. 
The estimation of multiple causal relationships underscores two unexpected 
findings which are to be additionally examined: an almost negligible role of the Euro 
area in the markets (both as an originator and recipient of causal linkages) and the 
position of the USA receiving rather than generating causal linkages in the sovereign 
debt market.  
A possible explanation for the first phenomenon is that the risk of the conta-
gion from the Euro area to other regions may be overestimated. This view is line with 
the “wake-up-call” hypothesis of contagion when only countries with weak macroe-
conomic fundamentals and having close economic ties with an originator are subject 
to the direct transfer of instability. The “wake-up-call” contagion should be distin-
guished from “pure” contagion when financial distress is virtually a random walk 
process with little dependence on fundamentals. If analyzed from this perspective, 
the situation inside the Euro area can be assessed as a “wake-up-call” contagion, with 
the other economies in the sample relatively unaffected so far due to more resilient 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Though not claimed as totally correct, this view is 
consonant with earlier findings on moderate propagation effects of the European cri-
sis (Tamim Bayoumi and Francis Vitek 2011; Rafaella Giordanno, Marcello   
Pericolli, and Pietro Tommasino 2013). 
The USA may be Granger caused in the public debt market owing to the status 
of a safe haven in terms of the crisis. Foreign investments in the US long-term gov-
ernment bonds are largely irresponsive to moderate shifts in their yields and tend to 
grow even when they shrink. Thus, inelastic demand for US public debt fueled by the 
massive reallocation of funds from other advanced economies’ sovereign debt during 
the crisis may be accountable for this unexpected position of the USA in multiple 
causal linkages in the sovereign debt market. 
The structure of the causality matrices is also helpful in assessing the propen-
sity to contagion. The overall density of causal relationships in the interbank and 
public markets is 15.4 and 20.4% of the total number (16
2 - 16 = 240) of potential 
linkages. It is also interesting to compare the structure of causal relationships in both  
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markets, picking up overlapping elements of causality matrices. There is little com-
monality in them: only about 12.2% of causal relationships coincide. On the one 
hand, the findings enable to assert that the propagation velocity of contagion between 
the interbank and public debt markets is likely to be moderate. On the other hand, 
“thin” and structurally heterogeneous causal relationships may exacerbate the situa-
tion as more countries are engulfed by contagion, while under such network struc-
tures they are much less incentivized to work out mechanisms for rapid liquidity real-
location to bail out each other. This view seems to prevail in the literature on finan-
cial networks and contagion. Such “thin” and heterogeneous network structures re-
flecting causal relationships in both markets fall under the category of separated in-
complete networks which are more prone to contagion (Franklin Allen and Douglas 
Gale 2000, 2007). 
 
4. Dynamic Volatility Indices in Interbank and Public Debt 
Markets  
 
It is important to shed light on the mechanics of the underscored causal linkages. It is 
natural to assume that it hinges around volatility spillovers. As pointed above, due to 
a limited time series length, multivariate GARCH models cannot be applied to track 
them. To overcome the difficulty, I resort to a simpler, yet an established approach - 
computing rolling correlations. For example, they are used to model financial inte-
gration (Jan Babecky, Luboc Komarek, and Zlatuse Komarkova 2008) and contagion 
(Srobona Mitra and Elena Duggar 2007). 
The overall volatility dynamics in September 2008 - August 2012 is to be 
tracked, so I actually calculate rolling correlation matrices. The baseline rolling win-
dow is set to 12 months. To ensure robustness of the results, 6- and 18-month rolling 
windows are also applied. Dynamic volatility indices (DVI) are the sums of correla-
tion ratios in the rolling correlation matrices which have 16x16 dimension and are 
computed for a given rolling window t as: 
 
2
16
16
1
16
1 



ij
ij
t
r
DVI .  (2)
 
This simple metric builds on the well-known premise that in the periods of fi-
nancial turmoil asset prices tend to co-move, whereas in tranquil times their changes 
are less correlated, giving more opportunities for portfolio diversification. Therefore, 
higher values of DVIs are indicative of deteriorating financial conditions in the inter-
bank or public debt market. By comparing the dynamics of the DVIs, one can judge 
about a possible volatility spillover as well as detect the transformation of the inter-
national banking crisis into the public debt one with more precision (Figure 1, panel 
a, b, c). 
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Panel a 
 
 
Panel b 
 
 
Panel c 
 
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
 
Figure 1  Dynamic Volatility Indices in the Interbank and the Public Debt Market for:  
  (a) 12-Month; (b) 6-Month; (c) 18-Month Windows 
 
In the interbank market the threshold is the period November 2008 - October 
2009 for the 12-month window; November 2008 - April 2009 for the 6-month win-
dow, and September 2008 - February 2010 for the 18-month window. The middle 
points of the periods are used to narrow down the determination of structural breaks. 
The analysis reveals a volatility shrinkage starting from the yearly 2009 (January-
April) in the interbank market. Then DVIs converge to a near-zero level. As for the 
public debt market, its volatility leaps in October-November 2009 and remains high 
up to August 2012. Thus, October-November 2009 is considered as the time of the 
credit risk transfer from the interbank to public debt markets. This timing of the 
transfer corresponds to the first manifestations of the Euro area public debt fragility 
(Ireland and Greece) in the late 2009. For example, Constantin Gurdgiev et al. (2011) 
present a detailed account of how speculative lending and disproportionate external 
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borrowing by Irish banks undermined the fiscal balance of the “Celtic tiger”. Similar 
evidence on all the PIGS referring precisely to the late 2009 is reported in Abel L. 
Costa Fernandes and Paulo R. Mota (2011). 
Additionally, I examine if the DVIs are sensitive to changes in the sample 
composition. To this end, additional DVI series are generated: first, when the USA 
data are excluded and, second, when the Euro area data are eliminated. Judging by 
the correlation ratios between the new and full sample DVIs which are very close to 1 
(Table 5), the indicators used to track the timing of the credit transfer appear robust 
to the exclusion of major economies. 
 
Table 5   A Sensitivity Test Results for DVIs 
 
Variable Rolling  window  DVI (USA excluded)  DVI (Euro area excluded) 
Interbank_rate 
Pubdebt_rate 
 
12 
0.992 
0.984 
0.994 
0.985 
Interbank_rate 
Pubdebt_rate 
 
6 
0.986 
0.978 
0.987 
0.994 
Interbank_rate 
Pubdebt_rate 
 
18 
0.995 
0.983 
0.996 
0.985 
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
The dynamic volatility indices not only help identify the transformation of one 
crisis into another, they may also be relevant in assessing systemic risk build-ups in 
the interbank and public debt markets. They may appear useful as components of 
composite financial conditions indices as well. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The paper explores causal linkages between interbank and public debt markets in 14 
OECD countries, the Euro area and Russia. The analysis has been implemented for 
individual countries and in a multivariate framework. For 11 countries the causal 
relationships have been underscored. In case of Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, 
the USA and Russia they are bidirectional. 
The multivariate analysis identifies systemically important countries in the in-
terbank and public debt markets. The USA, Switzerland, Australia, South Korea and 
Russia are of particular significance in the interbank lending market. Switzerland, the 
UK, Poland, Australia and Canada play a pivotal role in the public debt market. The 
minor role of the Euro area in both markets and that of the USA in the public debt 
one have been found and explained.  
As for the analysis of multiple causal linkages, substantial heterogeneity in the 
network structure of both markets has been revealed: only about 12% of causal rela-
tionships coincide. The relationships in both markets constitute separated incomplete 
networks which exhibit higher proneness to crisis propagation if compared with 
tightly connected structures.  
Volatility spillovers are likely to underlie the causal linkages. They are esti-
mated by means of dynamic volatility indices based on rolling correlation matrices 
and help identify the transformation of the international banking crisis into the public 
debt one. It is dated as of October-November 2009. The dynamic volatility indices 
can also be helpful in tracking systemic risk build-ups in both markets.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 6   Results of Diks-Panchenko Nonparametric Causality Test 
 
Lag number 
INTB_RATE does not cause LONGT_RATE  LONGT_RATE does not cause INTB_RATE 
T-statistic  p-value  T-statistic  p-value 
Australia 
1 -2.38  0.99  -0.98  0.84 
2 -2.39  0.99  -0.35  0.64 
3 -1.79  0.96  -0.77  0.78 
4 -0.35  0.63  1.10  0.14 
5 -0.23  0.59  0.34  0.37 
Canada 
1 -1.07  0.86  -1.13  0.87 
2 -1.10  0.86  -1.27  0.90 
3 0.76  0.22  0.90  0.18 
4 1.00  0.16  -0.01  0.50 
5 0.32  0.37  -1.04  0.85 
Czech Republic 
1 -0.17  0.57  -1.07  0.86 
2 -0.10  0.54  0.82  0.21 
3 -0.95  0.83  0.63  0.26 
4 -0.35  0.63  1.25  0.11 
5 -1.06  0.86  0.83  0.20 
Iceland 
1 1.12  0.13  0.80  0.21 
2 -1.04  0.85  -0.98  0.84 
3 -0.50  0.69  1.18  0.12 
4 -1.07  0.86  1.03  0.15 
5 -0.98  0.84  0.75  0.23 
Japan 
1 -0.40  0.65  0.63  0.26 
2 -0.09  0.54  1.40 0.08 
3 -0.42  0.66  1.05  0.15 
4 -0.69  0.75  1.03  0.15 
5 0.86  0.20  0.97  0.17 
South Korea 
1 0.23  0.41  -0.95  0.83 
2 -0.45  0.67  0.90  0.19 
3 0.20  0.40  0.42  0.34 
4 1.00  0.16  0.22  0.41 
5 0.67  0.25  0.47  0.32 
Norway 
1 -0.86  0.80  0.27  0.39 
2 -1.09  0.86  0.76  0.22 
3 0.27  0.39  0.93  0.18 
4 0.83  0.20  -0.19  0.57 
5 -0.17  0.57  0.28  0.39 
Poland 
1 -0.43  0.67  1.37 0.09 
2 -1.86  0.97  1.26  0.10 
3 -1.57  0.94  1.41 0.08 
4 -1.96  0.98  1.02  0.16 
5 -1.39  0.92  0.32  0.37 
Sweden 
1 0.95  0.17  0.38  0.35 
2 0.51  0.30  0.86  0.20 
3 0.70  0.24  0.97  0.17 
4 1.03  0.15  1.04  0.15 
5 0.60  0.28  1.07  0.14 
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Switzerland 
1 0.90  0.18  1.34 0.09 
2  -0.35  0.64 0.36 0.36 
3  0.31  0.38 0.17 0.43 
4  0.55  0.29 -0.20 0.58 
5  1.24  0.11 -0.23 0.59 
Euro area 
1  -1.14  0.87 -0.04 0.52 
2  -1.18  0.88 -1.05 0.85 
3  -1.31  0.90 0.30 0.38 
4  -1.30  0.90 -0.31 0.62 
5 -0.74  0.77  1.46 0.07 
UK 
1  -1.62  0.95 -1.59 0.94 
2 -0.70  0.76  1.32 0.09 
3  -0.68  0.75 0.17 0.43 
4  -0.54  0.71 -0.55 0.71 
5  0.21  0.42 -0.87 0.81 
USA 
1  0.45  0.33 0.61 0.27 
2  0.18  0.43 1.08 0.14 
3  -0.69  0.75 0.84 0.20 
4  -0.08  0.53 1.07 0.14 
5  0.58  0.28 0.83 0.20 
Russia 
1  1.96 0.02 2.21 0.01 
2 1.19  0.12  1.44 0.07 
3  1.43 0.08  0.85 0.20 
4 0.80  0.21  1.44 0.07 
5 0.53  0.30  1.39 0.08 
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
Table 7   Results of Principal Components Analysis for Main Central Bank Rates 
 
Number of principal 
component  Eigenvalue  Variance proportion  
explained 
Cumulative variance  
proportion explained 
1 8.49  0.53  0.53 
2 2.44  0.15  0.68 
3 1.72  0.11  0.79 
4 0.81  0.05  0.84 
5 0.73  0.05  0.89 
6 0.46  0.03  0.92 
7 0.38  0.02  0.94 
8 0.29  0.02  0.96 
9 0.21  0.01  0.97 
10 0.17  0.01  0.98 
11 0.11  0.01  0.99 
12 0.06  0.00  0.99 
13 0.05  0.00  0.99 
14 0.04  0.00  1.00 
15 0.03  0.00  1.00 
16 0.01  0.00  1.00 
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
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Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
 
Figure 2  Selection of the most Informative Principal Components on the Basis of the Scree Plot 
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